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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Vance E. Thumm appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 After a night of drinking, Thumm, Deven Ohls, and several other people went to 
an early morning party at a Boise Budget Inn room that Thumm had rented.  (Trial Tr.1, 
Vol. I, p.315, Ls.6-25, p.439, L.18 – p.470, L.7, p.493, L.8 – p.499, L.7, p.539, L.22 – 
p.551, L.6; Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.696, L.3 – p.718, L.24, p.850, L.7 – p.864, L.10.)  At some 
point, Thumm physically attacked Ohls, striking him with a closed fist several times in 
the head.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.499, L.8 – p.523, L.12; Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.718, L.25 – p.726, 
L.15, p.865, L.9 – p.893, L.16.)  Another person kicked Ohls and stabbed him in the 
buttock.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.507, L.14 – p.508, L.21; Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.724, Ls.12-23, 
p.869, L.16 – p.870, L.5.)  The attack continued for a time, all over the hotel room and in 
the bathroom.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.499, L.8 – p.523, L.12; Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.718, L.25 – 
p.726, L.15, p.865, L.9 – p.893, L.16.) 
 The stated charged Thumm with aggravated battery, felony intimidation of a 
witness, and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.  (See R., p.350; Prelim. Tr., 
                                                     
1 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Thumm’s motion to take judicial notice of the trial 
transcripts associated with the underlying case and direct appeal, State v. Thumm, Idaho 
Supreme Court Docket No. 37512.  (2/9/18 Order.)  In this brief, the state refers to the 




p.1, L.23 – p.2, L.4.2)  The state dismissed the felony intimidation of a witness charge 
during the preliminary hearing.  (Prelim. Tr., p.37, Ls.17-20.)  The state asserted that 
Thumm was guilty of aggravated battery for “kicking and/or stomping and/or punching 
and/or stabbing Deven Ohls about the face and/or body” and/or that Thumm aided and 
abetted others who used such force on Ohls.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.50, L.16 – p.51, L.4.)  
The state also charged Frankie Hughes, Chris Smith, and Paris Davis in connection with 
the attack.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.974, L.24 – p.975, L.6.)  Specifically, the state charged 
Davis with solicitation of felony destruction of evidence and being an accessory to 
Thumm’s aggravated battery for encouraging Thumm and Hughes to destroy the clothes 
they wore at the time of the incident.  (R., p.351; Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.51, L.20 – p.52, L.6.)  
The district court granted the state’s motion to join Thumm’s and Davis’ cases together 
for trial.  (R., p.282.)  Prior to trial, Thumm was represented by Nick Wollen from the 
Ada County Public Defender’s Office.  (See R., p.351.)  On September 10, 2009, 
approximately six weeks before the start of the jury trial, Thumm retained Virginia Bond 
as private counsel.  (See R., pp.246, 351.)   
Police testimony and photographs admitted at the jury trial revealed the aftermath 
of the mêlée in the hotel room – a beaten and bloody Ohls, and a blood-spattered hotel 
room in disarray.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.369, L.16 – p.430, L.19.)  Ohls suffered significant 
bleeding, a concussion, two black eyes, a complex lip laceration, a nasal fracture, and the 
stab wound.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.257, Ls.2-19, Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.619, L.9 – p.644, L.23.)  
                                                     
2 The district court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript.  (R., p.76.)  
The Idaho Supreme Court granted Thumm’s motion to take judicial notice of the “trial 
transcripts.”  In his Appellant’s brief, Thumm cites to the preliminary hearing transcript.  
(See, e.g., Appellant’s brief, pp.28-29.)  The state presumes that the Idaho Supreme 
Court’s order taking judicial notice includes the preliminary hearing transcript, and in the 
alternative, moves for the Court to take judicial notice of this transcript.       
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State trial witnesses Hughes and Jeremy Steinmetz testified that they witnessed Thumm 
battering Ohls in the hotel room.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.723, L.12 – p.726, L.9; p.866, L.24 
– p.884, L.4.)  In its closing argument, the state argued that other evidence presented by 
the state corroborated the eyewitness testimony of Hughes and Steinmetz.  (Trial Tr. Vol. 
II, p.1096, L.7 – p.1109, L.8; p.1171, L.1 – p.1184, L.16.)  
The jury found Thumm and Davis guilty as charged.  (See R., p.351.)  The district 
court imposed a unified 40-year sentence with 15 years fixed upon Thumm.  (Trial Tr., 
Vol. I, p.1360, L.25 – p.1361, L.5.)  In a published opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed the judgment of conviction.  State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 285 P.3d 348 (Ct. 
App. 2012).   
 Through counsel, Thumm filed a post-conviction petition, and then an amended 
post-conviction petition containing additional claims and evidence.  (R., pp.7-65, 138-
211.)  Collectively, the petitions asserted approximately 15 claims and sub-claims 
asserting ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; a Brady3 violation, 
prosecutorial misconduct, and cumulative error.  (Id.)  The state filed an Answer, Motion 
for Summary Dismissal and brief in support, and supplemental briefing.  (R., pp.102-130, 
214-218.)  The state alleged that each of Thumm’s claims was conclusory, inadequately 
supported, waived, and/or otherwise failed as a matter of law.  (Id.)  
 After a hearing (Tr.), the district court granted the state’s motion for summary 
dismissal.  (R., pp.348-393.)  The court concluded that Thumm failed to allege facts 
which, if true, demonstrated he was entitled to relief on any of his claims.  (Id.)  Thumm 
timely appealed.  (R., pp.409-411.)  
                                                     





 Thumm states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the court erred in summarily dismissing the petition for 
post-conviction relief.    
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.10 (capitalization modified).) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Has Thumm failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims? 
 
2. Has Thumm failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims? 
 
3. Has Thumm failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his Brady claim?  
 
4. Has Thumm failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his prosecutorial misconduct claims? 
 




























Thumm Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred By Summarily 
Dismissing His Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claims 
 
A. Introduction 
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.4  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-39.)  However, as 
the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.350-393), these claims fails because Thumm 
has failed to allege facts which, if true, demonstrate he is entitled to relief. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on 
file.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007). 
 
C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Each Of Thumm’s Ineffective Assistance 
Of Trial Counsel Claims 
 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that he is entitled to relief.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).    
                                                     
4 In addition to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims the state responds to in 
Issue I, Thumm also raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel as an alternative 
argument to his direct Brady and prosecutorial misconduct claims.  The state address 




 Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the 
applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential 
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.”  Berg v. State, 
131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).  Until controverted by the state, 
allegations in a verified post-conviction application are, for purposes of determining 
whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true.  Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 
531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975).  However, the court is not required to accept either the 
applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the 
applicant’s conclusions of law.  Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).   
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 
P.2d 299, 307 (1989).  Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do 
not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Roman, 125 Idaho 
at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. 
An attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.  Gibson v. State, 
110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 
P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).  “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation 
of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable….”  
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  A defense counsel’s choice of witnesses, manner of cross-
examination, and lack of objections to testimony are generally considered to be tactical or 
strategic decisions.  Grove v. State, 161 Idaho 840, 851, 392 P.3d 18, 29 (Ct. App. 2017) 
(citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 877 P.2d 365 (1994)).  Therefore, such decisions can 
be considered deficient performance pursuant to Strickland only if made on the basis of 
an ignorance of the law, inadequate preparation, or another shortcoming capable of 
objective review.  State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 384, 313 P.3d 1, 40 (2013); Giles, 125 
Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368.       
To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different.  Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. 
State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 245 (Ct. App. 1999).  Where the alleged 
deficiency is trial counsel’s failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if 
pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court is generally determinative of both 
prongs of the Strickland test.  State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 512, 988 P.2d 1170, 1186 
(1999).     
In this case, Thumm challenges the district court’s summary dismissal of 
approximately 15 ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims and sub-
claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel claims that function as alternative 
arguments to direct claims of trial error.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-39.)  Thumm’s 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims generally constitute a second-guessing of the 
manner in which Thumm’s trial counsel chose to cross-examine witnesses, made or 
declined to make objections, or argued legal issues to the court.  The state submits that 
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each of these claims is conclusory, inadequately supported by law and fact, and/or 
otherwise fails to demonstrate Strickland deficiency, particularly when considered in the 
context of trial counsel’s authority to make strategic decisions throughout the course of a 
four-day jury trial with 11 witnesses.  Likewise, the state asserts that Thumm has failed to 
demonstrate Strickland prejudice with respect to any of his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, and that the individual portions of the trial upon which Thumm bases his 
numerous criticisms of counsel’s performance did not have an impact upon the critical 
issues of the case and the determinations made by the jury, particularly in light of the 
strength of the state’s case.  (See Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.1087, L.16 – p.1123, L.10, p.1163, L.1 
– p.1185, L.21 (the prosecutor summarizing the evidence against Thumm and Davis in 
his closing and rebuttal arguments).)        
In fact, Thumm appears to have acknowledged that the majority of his ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims do not, by themselves, demonstrate he is entitled to 
relief.  He instead asserts that the claims combine to demonstrate cumulative prejudice.  
In the hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal, Thumm described his post-
conviction petition as presenting a “bag of problems,” and stated that while “[m]ost of 
[the problems] I can’t point out and say:  Yeah, he would have been acquitted based on 
this specific one,” that the court should look cumulatively at “what happened from 
beginning to end.”  (Tr., p.31, L.25 – p.32, L.8.)  Likewise, in his Appellant’s brief, 
Thumm noted that he “raises many errors with the first two being the most significant 
and the rest having a more cumulative effect.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.1.)  While, as 
discussed below, prejudice may be cumulated in a Strickland analysis, the state submits 
that Thumm’s “kitchen sink” approach reveals a difficulty in establishing Strickland 
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deficient performance or prejudice with respect to any individual claim.  Further, even in 
a cumulative error analysis, there is no prejudice to cumulate when a petitioner has failed 
to demonstrate more than one incident of deficient performance.  See Commonwealth v. 
Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 321 (Pa. 2011).        
The district court correctly concluded that Thumm failed to demonstrate 
Strickland deficient performance and/or prejudice with respect to any of his ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims.  To the extent this Court construes or organizes 
Thumm’s claims differently than the state has in this brief, the state adopts the reasoning 
set forth by the district court in its order granting the state’s motion for summary 
dismissal.  (See R., pp.348-393).   
 
D.  The District Court Correctly Dismissed Thumm’s Ineffective Assistance Of Trial 
Counsel Claims Related To The Joinder Of Thumm’s and Davis’ Cases For Trial 
 
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the state’s motion to join 
Thumm’s and Davis’ cases for trial and/or for failing to file a motion to sever the cases 
prior to, or during, the trial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-21.)  However, as the district court 
correctly concluded (R., pp.356-367), Thumm failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient 
performance or prejudice.  
Several months prior to trial, the state moved to join Thumm’s, Davis’, and 
Hughes’ cases for trial.5  (See R., p.278.)  At a subsequent hearing, the state argued that 
joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 8 and 13 was appropriate because there were a number of 
common trial witnesses between the cases and because the charges all arose from the 
                                                     
5 For reasons that are not clear from the appellate record in this case, Hughes was 
ultimately not tried with Thumm and Davis.  (See generally Trial Tr.) 
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same act or transaction.  (Id.)  An attorney from the Ada County Public Defender’s 
Office, which represented Thumm at the time, sought a continuance because she was not 
the handling attorney on the case and was not familiar with the relevant facts and issues.  
(Id.)  Davis’ counsel objected to the state’s motion on the ground that joinder would be 
prejudicial to Davis.  (R., pp.278-279.6)  At a continued hearing, Nick Wollen, Thumm’s 
handling attorney from the Public Defender’s Office, informed the court that Thumm 
intended to retain private counsel.  (R., p.282.)  Wollen did not address the state’s 
pending motion for joinder, but asked the court to continue the scheduled jury trial.  (See 
id.)  Davis’ counsel renewed her objection to the state’s motion.  (Id.)  The district court 
granted the state’s motion for joinder and continued the jury trial.  (Id.)  The court stated 
that it “[d]id not see any issue that required that these matters be subject to separate 
trials,” but that “as the case develops, something could occur that could require that.”  
(Id.)  
During the trial, the state elicited evidence which, Thumm now asserts 
(Appellant’s brief, pp.13-21), prejudiced him because it would not have been admissible 
had he been tried individually.  Specifically, both Jeremy Steinmetz and Frankie Hughes 
testified that, after the attack in the hotel room, Paris Davis told Thumm that he was 
“going to prison.”  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.755, Ls.15-21; p.899, Ls.21-23.)  Hughes 
additionally testified that Davis told Thumm and Hughes, after the attack, that they 
needed to burn their clothes, which had blood on them.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.899, L.24 – 
p.901, L.22.)  These statements from Davis, Thumm asserts, would have constituted 
                                                     
6 Portions of the transcripts of the two pretrial hearings related to the joinder issue were 
included in the clerk’s record on appeal.  
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inadmissible hearsay, as opposed to admissible statements of a party opponent, if Thumm 
had been tried individually.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-21.)   
 Additionally, Thumm points to evidence that was admitted to prove that Davis 
had knowledge that Thumm committed a felony, a necessary element of her charges of 
solicitation of felony destruction of evidence, I.C. § 18-2503, and accessory to the 
commission of a felony, I.C. § 18-205.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.18-20.)  This evidence 
included:  the nature of the high-risk felony traffic stop of Thumm’s and Davis’ vehicle, a 
stop which involved multiple police vehicles and officers with their weapons drawn; a 
testifying officer’s unsolicited blurt that Thumm invoked his right to silence during his 
arrest;7 and Davis’ counsel’s concession during closing argument that Davis was guilty of 
misdemeanor solicitation of destruction of evidence.  (Id.)  Additionally, Thumm asserted 
he was prejudiced by:  a jury instruction involving Davis’ charges which, Thumm argued, 
assumed the truth of the charges against Thumm; and the fact that Thumm was required 
to split his preemptory challenges with Davis, who would have been looking for a 
different type of jury.  (Id.)      
The state construes this claim as encompassing two parts:  (1) that trial counsel 
was ineffective for declining to object to the state’s pretrial motion for joinder; and (2) 
that trial counsel was ineffective for declining to utilize a Bruton8 challenge to sever the 
cases, either prior to or during trial.  Thumm has failed to demonstrate Strickland 
deficient performance or prejudice with respect to either of these sub-claims.     
                                                     
7 In affirming Thumm’s judgment of conviction, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that this 
unobjected-to blurt did not constitute fundamental error.   Thumm, 153 Idaho at 541-542, 
285 P.3d at 356-357.    
 
8 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).  
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1. Thumm’s Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Object To 
The State’s Pretrial Motion For Joinder 
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 8(b) provides that joinder of defendants is proper “if they are 
alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or 
transactions, constituting an offense or offenses.”  “The propriety of joinder is determined 
by what is alleged, not what the proof eventually shows.”  State v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71, 
73, 539 P.2d 999, 1001 (1975).  
The purpose of joinder is to promote judicial efficiency and “conserve state funds, 
diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing 
those accused of crime to trial.”  United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986) 
(quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968)).  For these reasons, federal 
courts and some state courts broadly construe the language of Rule 8 in favor of joinder.  
See, e.g., United States v. Rock, 282 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting federal rule 8(a) 
is broadly construed in favor of joinder); State v. Reeder, 182 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2006) (noting that “liberal joinder” is favored in the interest of judicial economy).  
 Thumm has failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient performance or prejudice 
with respect to this sub-claim.  As the district court concluded (R., p.366), the initial 
joinder of the cases was proper, and therefore, any objection from Thumm’s counsel 
would have been unsuccessful – just as Davis’ counsel’s objection was unsuccessful.  The 
state’s charging information alleged that Thumm and Davis participated in the same 
series of acts or transactions constituting the offenses charged.  (See Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.50, 
L.8 – p.52, L.6.)  Further, the only prejudice alleged by Thumm as a result of the joinder 
concerned statements and evidence presented at the subsequent trial.  Thumm has not 
attempted to argue how, or if, his trial counsel should have anticipated the presentation of 
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this particular evidence at the time of the state’s pretrial joinder motion.  Further, 
considering the strength of the state’s case, Thumm has failed to demonstrate that an 
individual trial, and the absence of the highlighted evidence discussed above, would have 
resulted in an acquittal.  
2. Thumm’s Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Move To 
Sever The Cases Prior To, Or During, The Trial 
 
 In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the United States Supreme Court 
held that the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant from incriminating out-of-court 
statements of co-defendants being used against him in a joint trial where the co-defendant 
does not testify and thereby does not become subject to cross-examination.  In that case, 
Bruton was tried with a co-defendant, Evans.  Id. at 124.  Evans did not testify at the trial, 
but evidence of Evans’ pretrial confessions were admitted into evidence.  Id. at 124-128, 
136.  These confessions implicated Bruton in the charges against him.  Id.  The United 
States Supreme Court held that introduction of Evans’ confessions added substantial 
weight to the prosecution’s case in a form that was not subject to cross-examination, 
thereby violating Bruton’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  Id. at 126-137.   
However, in order to implicate the confrontation clause as interpreted by Bruton, 
a co-defendant’s incriminating statement must be “testimonial” in nature.  See United 
States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 643, 651 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Bruton is simply irrelevant in the 
context of nontestimonial statements.”); United States v. Clark, 717 F.3d 790, 816 (10th 
Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause upon which it is premised, 
does not apply to nontestimonial hearsay statements.”) (citation omitted); United States v. 
Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53, 65-66 (1st Cir. 2010) (“the Bruton rule does not apply to non-
testimonial hearsay statements.”); United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed. Appx. 449, 454 (6th 
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Cir. 2008) (“The statement at issue…is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not 
implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”)   
Whether a statement is testimonial is determined by looking at the statement’s 
primary purpose and its similarities to traditional testimony.  State v. Stanfield, 158 Idaho 
327, 332, 347 P.3d 175, 180 (2015) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 
(2006)).  Testimony is defined as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”  Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).  Therefore, a statement is testimonial when “the circumstances 
objectively indicate that…the primary purpose…is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”  Id.  (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).  
When no such primary purpose exists, the statement is nontestimonial and its 
admissibility is governed by state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation 
Clause.  Id. (citing Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358-359 (2011)).  Further, the co-
defendant’s statement, even if testimonial, must be “directly incriminating” against the 
defendant in order for Bruton to apply.  State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 337-339, 193 
P.3d 878, 884-886 (Ct. App. 2008).  
 Parties properly joined under I.C.R. 8(b) may later be severed under I.C.R. 14 if it 
appears that one of the defendants or the state would be prejudiced by a joinder of 
defendants for trial.  State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State 
v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71, 73, 539 P.2d 999, 1001 (1975).  The defendant has the burden of 
showing such prejudice.  Caudill, 109 Idaho at 226, 706 P.2d at 460; Cochran, 97 Idaho at 
74, 539 P.2d at 1002.  An I.C.R. 14 motion to sever must be filed within 28 days after the 
entry of a plea of not guilty or seven days before trial, whichever is earlier.  I.C.R. 
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12(b)(5), (d).  However, I.C.R. 14 also permits a trial court to shorten or enlarge the time 
to file, and, for good cause shown or for excusable neglect, to relieve a party of the 
failure to comply with the timeliness requirement of the rule.   
 In the federal system, pursuant to the analogous F.R.C.P. 14, severance is not 
mandated “whenever codefendants have conflicting defenses.”  Zafiro v. United States, 
506 U.S. 534, 538 (1993).  Thus, “mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per 
se” and F.R.C.P. 14 does not require severance even if some prejudice is shown.  Id. at 
538–539.  Further, criminal defendants “are not entitled to severance merely because they 
may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials.”  Id. at 540.  Instead, severance is 
proper “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial 
right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about 
guilt or innocence.”  Id. at 539; see also United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 
1121-1126 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing Zafiro and analyzing F.R.C.P. 14).    
 As the district court correctly concluded (R., p.365), there was no Bruton problem 
in this case, either evident before trial, or considering the evidence admitted at trial, 
because no testimonial statements of Davis directly incriminating Thumm were admitted.  
Davis’ statement to Thumm that he was going to prison, and her statement to Thumm and 
Hughes that they needed to burn their bloody clothes, were clearly not made for the 
primary purpose of creating evidence for a subsequent trial.  Therefore, Thumm has 
failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective for not attempting to raise a 
Bruton-based motion to sever before trial, or a motion for a mistrial during trial, because 
such a motion would not have been successful.  Thumm has also failed to demonstrate 




 Additionally, the state submits that while Thumm has pointed to various evidence 
submitted at trial which, he asserts, demonstrates prejudice from the joinder, he has, on 
appeal, relied exclusively on a constitutional framework pursuant to Bruton.  Thumm has 
not argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a pretrial motion, or a 
motion for a mistrial, pursuant to I.C.R. 14 and I.C.R. 29.1.  (See Appellant’s brief, 
pp.13-21.)  Therefore, any such argument is waived on appeal.  State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 
192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992).  In any event, the state submits that any pretrial 
motion or motion for a mistrial made pursuant to I.C.R. 14 would have been 
unsuccessful.  The statements and evidence implicating Davis did not implicate or 
prejudice Thumm, particularly in light of the strength of the state’s case against Thumm.      
 Finally, in the alternative,9 and as the district court concluded (R., pp.359-361), 
Davis’ statements would have been admissible under the excited utterance exception to 
the hearsay exception even had Davis and Thumm been tried separately.  For this 
assertion, the state adopts the reasoning as set forth by the district court.  (Id.)   
 
                                                     
9 On appeal, Thumm asserts that the district court should not have even reached the 
Bruton issue because its Bruton analysis begins with the “faulty premise” that Davis’ 
statements would have been admissible even if Thumm was tried individually.  
(Appellant’s brief, p.18.)  The state submits that this is backwards.  There is no Bruton 
problem in this case because no testimonial statements of Davis directly incriminating 
Thumm were admitted at trial.  This is the end of Bruton inquiry.  Whether or not Davis’ 
statements would have been admissible against Thumm had he been tried individually is 
only relevant if this Court concludes that Thumm’s trial counsel was deficient for failing 
to move to sever the cases pursuant to a Bruton challenge or I.C.R. 14 motion.  In such an 
instance, the theoretical admissibility of the statements in an individual trial would be 
relevant (if not determinative) to a determination of whether Thumm was prejudiced by 
the joint trial and his trial counsel’s failure to obtain a severance.  In other words, even if 
Thumm’s trial counsel should have raised a motion to sever, and even if the district court 
would have granted such a motion – Thumm still cannot demonstrate he is entitled to 
relief because, as the court concluded, Davis’ statements would have been admissible 
against him regardless pursuant to the excited utterance exception.  
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E. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Thumm’s Ineffective Assistance Of Trial 
Counsel Claims Related To Counsels’ Pre-Trial Representation 
  
1. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective With Respect To Her Attempt To 
Suppress A Photo Lineup Utilized By Officers 
 
 Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely and adequately move to suppress 
a photo lineup utilized by officers that was admitted into evidence.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.38-39.)  However, as the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.372-373), Thumm 
has failed to demonstrate he was entitled to relief on this claim.  
 Shortly before trial, Thumm’s counsel filed a motion to suppress State’s Exhibit 
66, a photo lineup containing Thumm that investigators had presented to a state witness, 
on the ground that the lineup identification procedure was suggestive.  (R., pp.268-269; 
Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.30, L.19 – p.31, L.2.)  The district court did not rule on the motion, but 
informed counsel that she could make an appropriate objection when the evidence was 
presented at trial.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.31, Ls.3-5.)  During the trial, the state sought to 
admit the lineup through witness Detective Leavitt.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.290, L.12 – p.292, 
L.15.)  Thumm’s trial counsel objected and questioned Detective Leavitt in aid of the 
objection.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.292, L.16 – p.295, L.24.)  Counsel then argued that the 
lineup procedure utilized was faulty.  (Trial. Tr., Vol. I, p.296, Ls.5-8.)  The district court 
overruled the objection, concluding that a written admonition that was presented to the 
witness by Detective Leavitt indicated compliance with the policy established by the law 
enforcement agency, and that questions regarding the adequacy of the notice went to the 
weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility.  (Trial. Tr., Vol. I, p.296, L.24 – p.297, 
L.17.)       
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 In summarily dismissing this claim, the district court first noted that trial counsel 
did object to the admission of the photo lineup, and that counsel was thus clearly aware 
of the relevant potential legal implications of an unduly suggestive photo lineup.  (R., 
p.372.)  This indicates the manner in which trial counsel chose to make the objection was 
strategic, rather than being based upon some objective shortcoming such as ignorance of 
the relevant law.  Additionally, Thumm has failed to demonstrate that any alternative 
argument raised in support of trial counsel’s objection would have been successful.  
Thumm has therefore failed to demonstrate deficient performance.     
The district court also concluded that Thumm failed to demonstrate prejudice 
because he failed to show how the outcome of the trial would have been different had the 
lineup not been admitted.  (R., p.373.)  As the district court noted, Thumm was identified 
as a perpetrator in the aggravated battery by Hughes and Steinmetz, who both knew 
Thumm.  (R., pp.372-373.)  Additionally, the identification of Thumm generated by the 
photo lineup was of limited evidentiary value in this case because the lineup was 
presented to Aaron Childress – who was simply the employee at the hotel who checked 
Thumm in on the night of the attack.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.290, L.12 – p.299, L.23.)  It is 
not clear from the existing appellate record in this case whether this lineup was utilized to 
elicit any other witness identifications that were presented at trial.     
2. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Provide Physical 
Discovery To Thumm Prior To The Trial 
 
 Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide him physical copies of the 
discovery prior to the trial.  (Appellant’s brief, p.38.)  The state construes this claim as 
containing two parts: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective for entering into a pretrial 
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stipulation limiting Thumm’s personal access to discovery; and (2) whether trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to provide Thumm with physical copies of discovery 
documents that were not subject to the stipulation.  In both respects, the district court 
correctly dismissed this claim (R., pp.374-375) because it fails as a matter of law.   
 Prior to trial, Thumm’s counsel entered into a stipulated protective order with the 
state preventing anyone from disclosing the addresses of potential trial witnesses, or 
physically transferring police reports or compact discs related to the case to Thumm.  
(See R., p.374.)  The state asserted that this action was necessary because Thumm’s 
association with the Severely Violent Criminals gang created a concern that Thumm may 
hurt others associated with the case.  (See id.)   
 In summarily dismissing this claim, the district court concluded that Thumm 
failed to identify any specific discovery he was denied access to, or explain how such 
access would have changed the outcome of his trial.  (Id.)  Thumm also failed to argue 
that the stipulation entered into by trial counsel was somehow unwarranted, or that 
defense counsel would have successfully gotten access to the materials had she refused to 
enter into the stipulation.  Further, in her response to Thumm’s bar complaint regarding 
the stipulation, trial counsel explained that she was concerned about delays in obtaining 
complete redacted discovery in light of the fact that she was retained by Thumm 
relatively late in the criminal proceeding.  (R., pp.247-252.)  Additionally, trial counsel 
stated that she felt the stipulation was warranted given Thumm’s violent history, that she 
was genuinely concerned that Thumm was a member of a gang that could use violence to 
protect its members, and that the protection order could protect Thumm from any 
criminal accusations should anything happen to any of the witnesses prior to trial.  (Id.)   
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Thumm has failed to demonstrate that it was some objective shortcoming, rather than a 
tactical decision, that prompted trial counsel to enter into the stipulation, or that he was 
prejudiced by this decision.  
 Likewise, Thumm has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s decision not to 
provide him with physical copies of discovery that was not subject to the stipulated 
protection order constituted deficient performance, or how he was prejudiced from lack 
of access to physical discovery. Thumm’s counsel’s decision not to provide Thumm 
physical copies of discovery does not constitute deficient performance.  In her bar 
complaint response, counsel noted that she met with Thumm frequently to discuss the 
evidence in the case – though there was not enough time to get through everything “page 
by page.”  (R., pp.248-250.)  With respect to the Strickland prejudice prong, Thumm 
contends that if he had been given personal access to the discovery, he would have been 
able to better assist trial counsel on issues (discussed in greater detail below) related to a 
fingerprint report disclosed by the state (Appellant’s brief, p.38).  However, while 
Thumm raised a similar argument in a brief filed in response to the state’s motion for 
summary dismissal (R., p.235), Thumm did not present admissible evidence supporting 
this assertion.  Further, Thumm’s claim that he himself would have not only identified 
some relevant issue related to the fingerprint report (which, as discussed below, was not 
disclosed by the state until shortly before trial), but that he could have utilized this 
knowledge to assist his counsel and obtain a different trial outcome is optimistically 





3. Thumm’s Other Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claims Related 
To Counsels’ Pre-Trial Representation Are Waived On Appeal 
 
 On appeal, Thumm identifies other ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims 
related to trial counsels’ pretrial representation that were raised in his amended post-
conviction petition.10  (Appellant’s brief, pp.37-38.)  Further, Thumm noted that while he 
was “expressly appealing the dismissal of the entire petition and all claims” he would 
discuss only two of the claims related to his trial counsels’ pretrial representation in his 
Appellant’s brief.  (Appellant’s brief, p.13.)  The remainder of Thumm’s claims related to 
his trial counsels’ pretrial representation are waived because Thumm failed to support 
them with argument or authority on appeal.  State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 
P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument 
are lacking”).  In the alternative, should this Court choose to reach the merits of these 
claims, the state adopts the reasoning set forth by the district court as to why these claims 
fail.  (R., pp.368-372, 375-376.)   
 
F. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Thumm’s Ineffective Assistance Of Trial 
Counsel Claims Related To Thumm’s Counsel’s Trial Representation 
 
1. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Object To The 
District Court’s Rulings Regarding The Admissibility, As Impeachment 
Evidence, Of The Gang Memberships Of Potential Defense Witnesses 
 
 Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for declining to challenge and/or by inadequately 
challenging the district court’s rulings regarding the admissibility, as impeachment 
                                                     
10 In his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm additionally asserted that trial counsel 
was ineffective for: (1) failing to timely disclose an expert witness who would have 
purportedly provided exculpatory evidence; (2) missing a deadline to submit redacted 
tapes; and (3) failing to adequately prepare for state witness Helen Fischer’s testimony.  
(R., pp.160, 171-172, 190.)   
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evidence, of gang memberships and associations of potential defense witnesses.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.32-35.)  However, as the district court properly concluded (R., 
pp.376-379), this claim fails as a matter of law.      
 Prior to the jury trial, the district court ruled that evidence of membership or close 
association with the Severely Violent Criminal gang was admissible at trial, but only to 
impeach witnesses’ credibility.  (See R., p.376.)  Thumm’s trial counsel did not object to 
this ruling and conceded that gang membership evidence could be used for impeachment 
purposes with respect to Davis, Thumm, and another individual.  (See id.)  Later, during 
the trial, counsel raised the gang membership issue with respect to two other potential 
witnesses – Ariel Carpenter and Chris Smith.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.941, L.4 – p.942, L.8.)  
Counsel stated that she was concerned that if she called Carpenter or Smith to testify, the 
state would argue that they were associates of the Severely Violent Criminal gang, and 
would ultimately be able to impeach them on this association.  (Id.)  Counsel further 
noted that Chris Smith was a documented gang member, albeit not a member of the 
Severely Violent Criminal gang.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.942, Ls.1-8.)  Counsel did not 
discuss Carpenter’s gang membership or non-membership.  (See Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.941, 
L.4 – p.942, L.8.)  The district court cited United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), and 
informed Thumm’s counsel that defense witnesses may be impeached on their gang 
memberships, or on their gang associations if they were not members of the same gang.  
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.942, L.9 – p.945, L.1.)  The state informed the court that, should it 
become necessary, it possessed evidence that Smith was associated with Hughes and 
Thumm.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.943, Ls.5-20.)  Thumm’s counsel did not call either Smith 
or Carpenter as witnesses at the trial. 
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 On direct appeal, Thumm asserted that the district court erred by ruling that, 
should the defense call Smith to testify, the state would be permitted to impeach his 
testimony with information that both Thumm and Smith were alleged gang members.  
Thumm, 153 Idaho at 538-540, 285 P.3d at 353-355.  The Idaho Court of Appeals first 
rejected the state’s arguments that Thumm failed to preserve this claim for appeal, and 
that the district court did not enter an appealable ruling on the issue.  Id. at 538-539, 285 
P.3d at 353-354.  The Court then rejected Thumm’s argument that, pursuant to Abel, 
individuals had to be members of the same gang in order to be subject to gang 
membership-related impeachment.  Id. at 539-540, 285 P.3d 354-355.  The Court instead 
held that Abel reaffirmed the proposition that a district court has the discretion to 
determine admissibility of evidence showing bias, including evidence of gang 
membership, and is not foreclosed from admitting such evidence where the individuals in 
question are members of different gangs.  Id.  Then, applying its traditional standards 
related to a court’s use of discretion, it held that the district court did not err in concluding 
that any evidence of Smith’s gang association with Thumm would be relevant as 
impeachment evidence.  Id. at 540, 285 P.3d at 354.          
 In his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm asserted that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for: (1) failing to raise a constitutional challenge to the district court’s 
impeachment rulings, as opposed to merely a rules of evidence-based Abel challenge; (2) 
failing to challenge the district court’s “expansion” of its pretrial impeachment ruling to 
include Smith and Carpenter; and (3) failing to challenge the district court’s conclusion 
that Abel permitted gang membership-related impeachment even when the individuals 
are not members of the same gang.  (R., pp.166-170.)  
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 Thumm has failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient performance or prejudice 
with respect to any of these sub-claims.  First, with respect to all three sub-claims, 
Thumm has failed to demonstrate that any of the defense witnesses would have testified 
absent the court’s rulings, or identified what any of these witnesses would have testified 
about.  This alone is fatal to the claim and each associated sub-claim.  While, in his 
response to the state’s motion for summary dismissal (R., p.239), and Appellant’s brief 
(Appellant’s brief, pp.34-35), Thumm utilized police reports to speculate as to what 
Smith and Carpenter may have testified about, he has not presented any affidavits or 
other admissible evidence supporting this speculation.  Further, the jury was made aware 
of perhaps the most significant element of this speculated testimony – that Chris Smith 
punched and stabbed Ohls during the mêlée – through Thumm’s defense counsel’s cross-
examination of Detective Holland.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.988, L.24 – p.990, L.23.) 
Thumm has also failed to demonstrate that any constitutional challenge would 
have been successful.  In his Appellant’s brief, as in his amended post-conviction petition 
(R., p.166 n.2), Thumm cited cases standing for broad concepts associated with the 
constitutional rights of criminal defendants to present a defense.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.32, n.13 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (right of a defendant to testify 
in his own behalf); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (right to cross-
examine); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (right to present a meaningful 
defense)).  However, Thumm has failed to demonstrate or explain how any of these 
concepts, if argued, would have resulted in a different district court ruling regarding the 
admissibility of gang associations as impeachment evidence in this case.  This is 
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particularly true in light of the well-established principle that a state court’s application of 
its own state’s evidentiary rules generally does not offend the constitution.  See, e.g., 
Rock, 483 U.S. at 55 (reaffirming that an accused’s right to present relevant evidence 
“may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal 
trial process” (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295));  Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 
690 (1986) (“we have never questioned the power of States to exclude evidence through 
the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and 
reliability - even if the defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted”); Chambers, 
410 U.S. at 301 (“the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established 
rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the 
ascertainment of guilt and innocence”); Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 509 (2013) 
(“[o]nly rarely have we held that the right to present a complete defense was violated by 
the exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of evidence”).  Thumm has not 
demonstrated that the district court’s application of Abel in this case is the “rare” 
situation where the correct application of state evidentiary rules violates the constitution.  
Therefore, Thumm has failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective for not making 
such an argument, or that the district court erred by summarily dismissing this claim.  
 Also, Thumm has failed to argue, below or on appeal, that Carpenter was, in fact, 
not a member or associate of the Severely Violent Criminals gang.  Instead, Thumm 
appears to rely on the fact that the state did not present evidence of Carpenter’s gang 
association.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.32-33.)  At the trial, the district court simply ruled that 
evidence of gang membership or close association, if the state could present it, would be 
admissible as impeachment evidence.  Thumm’s trial counsel was in the best position to 
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evaluate the risks of facing such impeachment evidence should Carpenter be called as a 
witness.  Thumm has failed to demonstrate that this evaluation, and counsel’s decision 
not to call Carpenter as a witness, constituted anything other than an execution of trial 
strategy.    
 Finally, the Idaho Court of Appeals has already held, in the context of this case, 
that the reasoning set forth by Abel does not preclude the admission, for impeachment 
purposes, of gang-related associations even if the individuals are not a member of the 
same gang.  Thumm, 153 Idaho at 536-540, 285 P.3d at 351-355.  Thumm has not 
successfully demonstrated that the Court of Appeals’ opinion would have been different if 
only trial counsel had raised this argument in some different manner.  As the Court of 
Appeals held, Thumm’s defense counsel properly preserved this issue for appeal.  Id. at 
539, 285 P.3d at 354.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals had the jurisdiction to freely 
review, de novo, the relevancy of the evidence, regardless of what arguments were 
presented by Thumm.  Id. at 540, 285 P.3d at 355.    
2. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Impeach Jeremy 
Steinmetz On Alleged Inconsistencies Between His Preliminary Hearing 
Testimony And Trial Testimony, Or For Declining To Object To His 
Testimony About Thumm’s Statements To Him After The Attack 
 
 Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to impeach Jeremy Steinmetz on 
apparent inconsistencies between his preliminary hearing testimony and trial testimony 
with respect to whether he was afraid of Thumm; and (2) failing to object to Steinmetz’s 
testimony that Thumm told him “don’t say nothing” after the attack.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.27-30.)  The district court correctly dismissed this claim (R., pp.381-382), because it 
fails as a matter of law.    
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 During the pretrial investigation, Steinmetz failed to identify Thumm in a photo 
lineup that was presented to him by police.  (See Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.763, L.12 – p.764, 
L.13.)  At the jury trial, Steinmetz explained that while he could have identified Thumm 
in the lineup, he declined to do so because he was “kind of scared” of implicating Thumm 
to law enforcement.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.764, L.10 – p.765, L.10.)  However, as noted by 
Thumm in the post-conviction proceeding and on appeal, Steinmetz, at Thumm’s 
preliminary hearing, testified that he chose not to identify Thumm in the photo lineup 
because he was “just trying to protect [Thumm].”  (Prelim. Tr., p.21, Ls.9-13.)  The 
district court overruled an objection to counsel’s follow-up question of whether Steinmetz 
was “worried about what might happen if [Steinmetz] cooperated with police.”  (Prelim. 
Tr., p.21, Ls.14-18.)  Later in the hearing, Steinmetz testified that Thumm had not 
threatened him, and that instead, Steinmetz had “changed his story” with police “[o]nly 
after the police had told [Steinmetz] [Thumm’s] name,” which indicated to Steinmetz that 
the police “knew [Thumm].”  (Prelim. Tr., p.23, Ls.7-12.)  Near the conclusion of the 
preliminary hearing, immediately before the felony intimidation of the witness charge 
was dismissed, Steinmetz, in responding to questioning from the magistrate court, 
testified that he did not feel intimidated, threatened, or harassed by Thumm.  (Prelim. Tr., 
p.36, L.5 – p.37, L.20.)   
 Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to utilize I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that, 
several days after the attack, Thumm told Steinmetz, in the presence of Davis, “[d]on’t 
say anything.”  (See Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.36, L.8 – p.37, L.19.)  On the first day of the trial, 
the prosecutor discussed the I.R.E. 404(b) notice and explained that Thumm’s statement 
was admitted at the preliminary hearing to attempt to prove the felony intimidation of a 
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witness charge against Thumm – a charge that was ultimately dismissed.  (Id.)  The 
prosecutor argued that the statement did not constitute I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, but, even 
if the district court concluded otherwise, the statement should still be admitted because it 
demonstrated Thumm’s consciousness of guilt and Davis’ knowledge of the attack.  (Id.)  
Thumm’s trial counsel objected to the admission of the statement.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.38, 
Ls.14-24.)  The district court noted that while, “at first blush,” the statement appeared to 
be “overly prejudicial,” it would defer its ruling until the appropriate part of the trial so it 
could analyze the statement in context.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.38, L.25 – p.39, L.5.)  At the 
trial, the prosecutor raised the issue again shortly prior to the anticipated introduction of 
the statement.  (Trial Tr., Vol.  II, p.748, L.21 – p.749, L.5.)  The district court ruled that 
the statement was admissible.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.749, Ls.6-12.)  Thumm’s trial counsel 
did not attempt to renew her previous objection to the admission of the statement.  (Id.)  
Consistent with the ruling, Steinmetz later testified that Thumm told him “don’t say 
nothing” several days after the attack.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.762, L.6 – p.763, L.4.)  
Thumm has failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient performance or prejudice 
with respect to either sub-claim.  It is unsurprising that Thumm’s trial counsel would 
choose not to delve into, on cross-examination, any specifics regarding whether 
Steinmetz was afraid of Thumm.  This was a reasonable tactical decision, particularly 
considering it is unlikely that trial counsel could know, for certain, what Steinmetz’s 
response to such impeachment questions might be.  As the district court noted (R., p.382), 
trial counsel may have been concerned that it was, in fact, Steinmetz’s fear of Thumm 
that motivated him to deny, at the preliminary hearing, that Thumm had threatened or 
harassed him.  Also, it is notable that Thumm’s trial counsel did utilize the preliminary 
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hearing transcript to cross-examine Steinmetz during the jury trial on a different topic.  
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.796, L.17 – p.797, L.25.)  The fact that Thumm’s trial counsel was 
aware of the preliminary hearing transcript and Steinmetz’s testimony in it indicates that 
her decision not to impeach Steinmetz on whether he was afraid of Thumm was tactical, 
and not based upon some objective shortcoming, such as failing to review the preliminary 
hearing transcript.  Thumm has also failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to this 
sub-claim, particularly in light of the strength of the state’s case.  
Likewise, Thumm has failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient performance or 
prejudice with respect to his sub-claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to Steinmetz’s testimony that Thumm told him, “don’t say nothing” after the 
attack.  First, this statement was properly admitted at trial, and therefore, it did not 
constitute deficient performance for Thumm’s counsel to decline to renew her objection.  
State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463, 235 P.3d 409, 413 (2010) (“Rule 404(b) allows 
evidence of other acts if admitted for the purpose of showing knowledge or 
consciousness of guilt….Evidence of a defendant’s efforts to influence or affect evidence, 
such as intimidating a witness…may be relevant to demonstrate consciousness of guilt.” 
(internal citation and footnote omitted)).  Thumm also cannot demonstrate that the district 
court’s decision to admit the evidence would have changed if only Thumm’s counsel had 
renewed the objection.  In fact, the district court’s decision to admit the evidence can be 
read as an overruling of the objection that Thumm’s counsel already made.  Finally, 
Thumm has also failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to this sub-claim, 




3. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Object To Paris 
Davis’ Use Of The Term “Prison” At Trial 
 
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for declining to object to Paris Davis’ use of the term 
“prison” at trial,  a term which, Thumm asserts, was utilized as a legal conclusion.  
(Appellant’s brief, p.31.)  However, as the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.382-
383), this claim fails as a matter of law.          
 Before the start of the jury trial, the prosecutor informed the court of the 
anticipated trial evidence that Paris Davis told Thumm, after the attack, that he was 
“going to prison.”  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.31, L.16 – p.32, L.16.)  Thumm’s counsel objected 
to the testimony on the ground that, because Davis is not a legal expert, her opinion or 
understanding regarding whether Thumm was going to prison was not relevant.  (Trial 
Tr., Vol. I, p.32, L.18 – p.33, L.4.)  Davis’ counsel also objected to the admission of the 
statements.  (Trial. Tr., Vol. I, p.33, L.7 – p.34, L.5.)  The district court deferred its ruling 
until it could analyze the issue with the appropriate factual context during the trial.  (Trial 
Tr., Vol. I, p.35, L.14 – p.36, L.7.)  Prior to the admission of the statements, the 
prosecutor brought the matter to the attention of the district court.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, 
p.742, L.20 – p.743, L.20.)  Thumm’s counsel expressed concern that the prosecutor 
might inappropriately lead the witnesses to make the statement at issue.  (Trial. Tr., Vol. 
II, p.743, L.23 – p.744, L.3.)  The district court ruled that the statement was admissible, 
and that the state would be permitted to elicit the statement with leading questions to 
mitigate the risk that the witnesses might testify that Davis told Thumm that he was 
“going back to prison.”  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.745, L.8 – p.748, L.3) (emphasis added).  
Then, as noted above, both Jeremy Steinmetz and Frankie Hughes testified that, after the 
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attack in the hotel room, Paris Davis told Thumm that he was “going to prison.”  (Trial 
Tr., Vol. II, p.755, Ls.15-21; p.899, Ls.21-23.)    
 In his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm asserted that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to renew her pretrial objection to Davis’ statement on the 
ground that the term “prison” constituted a legal conclusion.  (R., pp.176-177.)  Thumm 
has failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient performance or prejudice with respect to 
this claim.  First, he has failed to demonstrate that the manner in which his trial counsel 
approached this issue was anything but a tactical decision.  Instead, Thumm appears to 
dock this claim to an assumption that Thumm’s mere failure to renew the objection, after 
raising it prior to trial, constitutes deficient performance.  However, counsel’s mere 
failure to renew the objection does not constitute per se deficiency.   As noted, the district 
court deferred its ruling on the statement, and then during trial ruled that the statement 
was admissible.  This can be read as an overruling of Thumm’s counsel’s prior objection 
that was already made.  Further, Thumm has also failed to demonstrate, or argue, that the 
statement was actually inadmissible.  Davis’ use of the term “prison” did not constitute 
some inadmissible “legal conclusion.”  The evidence was relevant to prove Davis’ 
knowledge that Thumm had committed an aggravated battery.  Thumm has also failed to 
demonstrate Strickland prejudice.  Davis’ statement, while likely damaging to her case, 
did not tend to prove Thumm’s guilt. 
4. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Impeach Frankie 
Hughes On The Specific Potential Exposure To Prison He Faced In 
Connection With This Case 
 
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Hughes on the fact that he 
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potentially faced up to 60 years of prison for his role in the attack.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.30-31.)  However, as he district court correctly concluded (R., pp.383-384), this claim 
fails as a matter of law.          
For his role in the attack on Ohls (and Ohls’ girlfriend, Brooke Everhart), Hughes 
was charged with two counts of aggravated battery and two counts of use of a deadly 
weapon during the commission of a crime.  (See R., p.190.)  In his amended post-
conviction petition, Thumm asserted that Hughes faced up to 60 years in prison for these 
crimes, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Hughes about this 
potential exposure and Hughes’ “great motivation to provide biased testimony against 
[Thumm].”  (R., pp.190-191.)     
 As the district court concluded (R., pp.383-384), this claim is belied by the record.  
Thumm’s trial counsel did cross-examine Hughes on his potential bias related to his 
criminal exposure.  Specifically, Thumm’s trial counsel cross-examined Hughes on: (1) 
his interview with police in which officers told him that they would “talk to the 
prosecutor about getting probation”; and (2) the fact that, despite Hughes’ testimony 
denying that he was involved in the attack on Ohls, Hughes was charged with two counts 
of aggravated battery, and that these two charges had been bound over by a magistrate 
judge.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.914, L.7 – p.916, L.9.)  Later in the trial, Thumm’s counsel 
elicited testimony indicating that Detective Holland told Hughes that he had a “good 
chance” at probation in his case.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.988, Ls.13-17.)  The state also 
elicited testimony from Hughes about his aggravated battery charges.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, 
p.908, Ls.2-19.)  During his closing argument, Davis’ counsel referenced the aggravated 




her closing argument, Thumm’s counsel specifically argued that “Frankie [Hughes] has a 
lot to gain by testifying and pointing the finger.”  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1157, L.24 – p.1158, 
L.2.)   
The fact that Thumm’s counsel did not elicit specific testimony about the 
maximum length of the sentences potentially faced by Hughes does not demonstrate 
Strickland deficient performance or prejudice.  Therefore, Thumm has failed to show that 
the district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim.   
5. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective With Respect To The Manner In Which 
She Cross-Examined Detectives Leavitt And Holland 
 
 Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for inadequately cross-examining Detectives Leavitt 
and Holland.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.35-37.)  However, as the district court correctly 
concluded (R., pp.384-385), this claim fails as matter of law.         
 Thumm’s trial counsel asked Detective Leavitt, upon cross-examination, about an 
interview he conducted with Ohls.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.308, L.2 – p.309, L.2.)  Counsel 
asked Detective Leavitt if Detective Holland, who was also at the interview, presented 
Ohls with a photo lineup.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.308, Ls.15-24.)  Detective Leavitt 
responded that he could not recall without looking at his police report.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, 
p.308, L.24 – p.309, L.2.)  Counsel did not attempt to refresh Detective Leavitt’s 
recollection.  Thumm’s counsel also asked Detective Leavitt whether Leavitt told Frankie 
Hughes, during a police interview, that the police had fingerprints and DNA on a bottle 
that would implicate Hughes in his battery of Ohls’ girlfriend, Brooke Everhart.  (Trial 
Tr., Vol. I, p.334, Ls.12-15.)  The district court sustained the state’s hearsay objection to 
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this question, because it was not Detective Leavitt that made this statement to Hughes.  
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.334, L.16 – p.335, L.21.)     
 Detective Holland subsequently testified at the trial.  (Trial. Tr., Vol. II, p.952, 
p.16 – p.1027, L.6.)  Upon cross-examination, Thumm’s trial counsel did not question 
Detective Holland either about the lineup presented to Ohls, or the statement to Hughes.  
(See Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.911, L.1 – p.914, L.1; p.985, L.9 – p.998, L.21; p.1026, Ls.1-21.) 
 In his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm argued that his trial counsel’s 
cross-examination of Detectives Leavitt and Holland constituted ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel because counsel ultimately failed to elicit testimony that: (1) the detectives 
met with Ohls and Everhart, presented them both lineups, including one that included 
Thumm, and that neither were able to identify a suspect; and (2) Detective Holland, in 
fact, deceptively told Hughes that police had fingerprints and DNA on a bottle that would 
implicate Hughes in his battery of Everhart.11  (R., pp.191-193.)   
 As the district court concluded (R., pp.384-385), Thumm failed to establish 
Strickland deficient performance or prejudice with respect to either sub-claim.  Thumm 
has failed to demonstrate that the decisions made by counsel in the course of her cross-
examination of the detectives was anything but strategic.  Further, the fact that Ohls 
failed to identify Thumm in a lineup was of very minimal significance in this case.  Ohls 
testified at the jury trial and did not identify his attackers.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.501, L.7 – 
p.516, L.21.)  Ohls did not identify Thumm even in the suggestive context of a jury trial 
at which Thumm was being charged in connection with the attack, and in fact, testified 
that he did not remember Thumm even being in the hotel room that night.  (Trial. Tr., Vol. 
                                                     
11 As discussed below, the fingerprint report was not actually generated until several 
months later.  (R., pp.202-203.) 
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I, p.515, L.10 – p.516, L.21.)  The fact that Ohls could also not identify Thumm in a 
pretrial investigative lineup would not have benefitted Thumm.       
 Further, Thumm failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s decision not to cross-
examine Detective Holland on his pretrial interview with Hughes constituted deficient 
performance.  Thumm has not demonstrated or alleged that Detective Holland’s deceptive 
interview tactics were somehow improper.  Further, as Thumm noted in his amended 
post-conviction petition, his counsel possessed the police report in which Detective 
Holland described his interview with Hughes.  (R., p.192.)  Thumm’s counsel’s 
possession of this report, as well as her previous questioning of Detective Leavitt 
regarding the same interview with Hughes, indicates that counsel’s decision not to follow 
up with Holland was strategic, as opposed to being based on some objective shortcoming, 
such as ignorance of the police report.  Further, contrary to Thumm’s apparent assertion, 
counsel’s decision not to follow-up on the issue after initially raising it with Detective 
Leavitt does not constitute per se deficient performance.  A defense attorney is entitled to 
evolve her strategic approach to a case as the case develops.  Finally, Thumm has also 
failed to demonstrate Strickland prejudice.  Thumm has not adequately explained how the 
deceptive nature of Detective Holland’s interview with Hughes prejudiced Thumm’s case.         
6. Thumm’s Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To 
Call Various Named Defense Witnesses Is Waived On Appeal 
 
 In his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm asserted that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to call various named individuals as witnesses during the trial.  
(R., pp.171-172.)  However, Thumm has not raised this claim in his Appellant’s brief.  
(See generally Appellant’s brief.)  Therefore, despite the fact that Thumm noted, in his 
Appellant’s brief, that he was “expressly appealing the dismissal of the entire petition and 
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all claims” (Appellant’s brief, p.13), this claim is waived pursuant to Zichko, 129 Idaho at 
263, 923 P.2d at 970 (“[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument 
are lacking”).  In the alternative, should this Court choose to reach the merits of this 
claim, the state adopts the reasoning set forth by the district court as to why this claim 
fails as a matter of law.  (R., pp.379-381.)   
II. 
Thumm Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel Claims 
 
A. Introduction 
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.20-21, 34 n.15, 
39-41.)  As the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.367, 385-387, 390-391), these 
claims fail as a matter of law.     
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on 
file.”  Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803. 
 
C. The District Court Properly Dismissed Thumm’s Ineffective Assistance Of 
Appellate Counsel Claims 
 
The two-prong Strickland test for ineffective assistance of trial counsel also 
applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 
859, 243 P.3d 675 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 
40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007)).  In order to establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 
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a petitioner has the burden of proving that his counsel’s representation on appeal was 
deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial.  Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998).  Even if a defendant 
requests that certain issues be raised on appeal, appellate counsel has no constitutional 
obligation to raise every non-frivolous issue requested by the defendant.  Jones v. Barnes, 
463 U.S. 745, 751-753 (1983); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181 
(1988) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-754).  As explained by the United States Supreme 
Court, “[e]xperienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the 
importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central 
issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues.”  Jones, 463 U.S. at 752.   The relevant 
inquiry is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the 
defendant would have prevailed on appeal.  Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); 
Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 629, 226 P.3d 1269, 1276 (2010) (citing State v. Payne, 
146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008)).  It is “difficult” to demonstrate that 
appellate counsel provided deficient performance simply for failing to raise a particular 
claim.  Robbins, 528 U.S. at 287-288. 
Thumm’s appellate counsel raised numerous claims on direct appeal.  
Specifically, appellate counsel asserted:  (1) the district court erred by denying Thumm’s 
motion for a mistrial after Hughes purportedly referenced Thumm’s alleged gang 
affiliation during the trial; (2) the district court erred by ruling that if the defense called 
Chris Smith to testify, then the state would be permitted to impeach his testimony that 
both Thumm and Smith were alleged gang members; (3) an officer’s trial testimony that 
Thumm invoked his rights constituted a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
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silent; (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct in numerous respects during closing 
argument; and (5) cumulative error.  Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 285 P.3d 348. 
Thumm has failed to demonstrate Strickland deficient performance or prejudice 
with respect to any of his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims.12  With 
respect to each claim, Thumm has failed to adequately allege or demonstrate that his 
appellate counsel’s decision not to raise the claims, or to not raise the claims in the 
manner Thumm now assets they should have been raised, was based upon some objective 
shortcoming.  Further, Thumm has failed to demonstrate that any of these claims would 
have been successful had they been raised on appeal, or that they were potentially more 
meritorious than any of the claims appellate counsel actually chose to raise.         
1. Appellate Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Attempt To Raise 
The Bruton Issue As Fundamental Error On Direct Appeal 
 
Thumm contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for declining to 
attempt to raise, as fundamental error, a claim that the joinder of his case with Paris 
Davis’ case violated his Sixth Amendment rights pursuant to Bruton.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.20-21.)  As the district court correctly concluded (R., p.367), this claim fails as a 
matter of law.   
 In Mintun, 144 Idaho at 662, 168 P.3d at 46, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that 
a claim alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise an issue as 
fundamental error “is not meritorious” for a number of reasons, including: a rule allowing 
such a claim “would be impractical, inefficient, and often disadvantageous to defendants 
whose interest would be better served by presenting such a claim in a post-conviction 
                                                     
12 Thumm also raises ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims related to his 
substantive Brady and prosecutorial misconduct post-conviction claims.  The state 




action asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel” for failing to object to the alleged 
error in the trial court; and a trial counsel’s failure to object to errors may be done for 
legitimate strategic or tactical purposes, and the record on appeal would rarely show this 
strategy.  Id.  Thumm’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
attempt to raise a Bruton challenge as fundamental error therefore fails as a matter of law 
and Thumm has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief.13   
 On appeal, Thumm appears to argue that his appellate counsel could have raised a 
Bruton challenge as preserved error on direct appeal.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.20-21.)  
Specifically, Thumm notes that Paris Davis’ counsel actually did raise an unsuccesful 
Bruton challenge during the trial.  (Id.; see also Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.744, Ls.12-22.)  
Thumm contends that this showed that “the district court would have overruled a Bruton 
objection had [Thumm’s] attorney made it, so it could be considered to have been 
preserved error.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.21.)  Thumm did not cite authority for this 
proposition that a co-defendant’s constitutional challenge is preserved for appeal if the 
other co-defendant preserves an analogous challenge that her constitutional rights were 
violated.  As Thumm acknowledges (id.), an objection related to the violation of Thumm’s 
constitutional rights “was not Paris Davis’ to make.”  This is because, as Thumm further 
acknowledged in his amended post-conviction petition (R., p.153), Davis’ Bruton 
challenge could not be the same as Thumm’s Bruton challenge because the challenges 
concern completely different statements, and thus require completely different analyses.  
                                                     
13 While the district court did not, in its summary dismissal order, cite Mintun or the 
general principle upon which Mintun is based, it did note that “the [s]tate contends that 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to appellate counsel fail, because the 
Bruton issue was not preserved for appeal….”  (R., p.385.)  Indeed, the state cited Mintun 
and thus provided Thumm notice for this specific ground for dismissal, as required by 
I.C. § 19-4906.  (R., pp.123-124.)   
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Therefore, if Thumm’s appellate counsel attempted to raise a Bruton challenge on direct 
appeal, it would have been analyzed under the Idaho fundamental error framework 
because Thumm’s trial counsel did not preserve this challenge with respect to Thumm’s 
constitutional rights.  Therefore, Thumm’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
claim fails as a matter of law.    
 In the alternative, this claim also fails because, for all of the reasons discussed 
above in Sec. I, Part D, a Bruton fundamental error challenge would have clearly been 
unsuccessful on appeal, because no testimonial statements of Davis were entered into 
evidence at trial.      
2. Thumm Has Failed To Show His Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective For 
Failing To Raise Various Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims 
 
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim 
that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise various prosecutorial 
misconduct claims on direct appeal.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.40-41.)  As the district court 
correctly concluded (R., pp.385, 390-391), this claim fails as a matter of law and Thumm 
has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief.      
On direct appeal, Thumm’s appellate counsel raised several prosecutorial 
misconduct claims.  Specifically, Thumm’s appellate counsel asserted that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by: (1) eliciting testimony from Hughes which indicated that 
Thumm was a gang member; (2) appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury 
during closing argument by asking the jury to picture themselves in the position of the 
victim; (3) eliciting testimony from an officer that utilized Thumm’s pre-Miranda silence 
to imply his guilt; and (4) misstating the reasonable doubt standard.  Thumm, 153 Idaho 
at 538, 542-544, 285 P.3d at 348, 357-359.  The final three of these claims were raised as 
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fundamental error on appeal.  Id.  In his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm 
asserted that his appellate counsel was ineffective because “he did not raise all of the 
issues of prosecutorial misconduct.”  (R., p.178.)  Specifically, Thumm contends that his 
appellate counsel should have asserted, as fundamental error, that the prosecutor 
additionally committed misconduct by: (1) eliciting testimony that Davis told Thumm 
that he was “going to prison” after the attack; (2) making disparaging comments about 
the defense during closing argument; (3) making statements about the victim during 
closing argument that were unsupported by the evidence; (4) mischaracterizing Hughes’ 
trial testimony during closing argument; and (5) utilizing unnecessarily inflammatory 
language when describing Thumm during closing argument.   (R., p.177 n.15, 178, 184-
188.)   
This claim is conclusory.  It does not constitute deficient performance for 
appellate counsel to decline to raise “all of the issues of prosecutorial misconduct.”  
Dunlap v. State, 159 Idaho 280, 296, 360 P.3d 289, 305 (2015) (“Courts have recognized 
that appellate counsel may fail to raise an issue on appeal because counsel foresees little 
or no likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is 
widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.” (citations and 
internal quotations omitted)).  Thumm has additionally failed to argue or demonstrate that 
appellate counsel’s decisions regarding which claims to raise were based upon some 
objective shortcoming, or that the claims he raises now were more meritorious than the 
claims actually raised by appellate counsel.  Finally, as the district court concluded (R., 
pp.390-391), there was also no reasonable probability that the claims raised by Thumm 
would have resulted in the vacating of his conviction if raised.  
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3. Thumm’s Claims That Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To 
Raise And/Or Inadequately Raising Abel and Brady Issues Are Waived  
 
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claims 
that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to attempt to raise Abel and Brady 
claims on direct appeal.  However, these claims are waived for appeal pursuant to Zichko, 
129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970 (“[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either authority 
or argument are lacking”), because Thumm has failed to support them with argument.   
 In his Appellant’s brief, Thumm only “noted” his claim that his appellate counsel 
was ineffective for failing to raise an Abel claim in the context of a footnote.  
(Appellant’s brief, p.34 n.15.)  Likewise, while Thumm references, in passing, his claim 
that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to attempt to raise a Brady claim on 
direct appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp.21, 39), Thumm failed to support this claim with 
argument.    
Even to the extent that either of these claims is not precluded by Zichko, they still 
fail as a matter of law because Thumm has not attempted to demonstrate Strickland 
deficient performance or prejudice with respect to either claim.  Therefore, Thumm has 
failed to show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing either claim.  
III. 
Thumm Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Brady Claim 
 
A. Introduction 
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his Brady 
claim that the state untimely disclosed certain fingerprint evidence.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.21-27.)   This claim is forfeited pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b) because Thumm could 
have raised it on direct appeal but did not.      
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on 
file.”  Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803. 
 
C. Thumm’s Post-Conviction Brady Claim Was Forfeited Pursuant To I.C. § 19-
4901(b) Because It Was Not Raised On Direct Appeal 
 
 A post-conviction petition is not a substitute for a direct appeal, and any issue 
which could have been raised to the trial court or on direct appeal, but was not, is 
forfeited.  I.C. § 19-4901(b); see also Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 702-703, 365 P.3d 
1050, 1056-1057 (Ct. App. 2015).  A post-conviction petition may overcome this 
forfeiture only if “it appears to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by 
affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial 
doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due 
diligence, have been presented earlier.”  Id. 
 The week prior to the trial, the state disclosed a fingerprint report to the defense.  
(See Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.750, Ls.2-9.)  During the trial, Thumm’s trial counsel objected to 
the admission of the fingerprint report because it was untimely pursuant to the district 
court’s pretrial orders.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.750, Ls.2-13.)  The state explained that it just 
itself obtained the report from the state crime laboratory the previous week, but that due 
to late disclosure, it would not attempt to introduce the report as evidence at trial.  (Trial 
Tr., Vol. II, p.750, Ls.15-25.)  The district court agreed with the parties and excluded the 
evidence.  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.751, Ls.1-13.) 
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 For the first time in his amended post-conviction petition, Thumm asserted that 
the state’s untimely disclosure of the fingerprint evidence constituted a Brady violation.  
(R., pp.179-184.)  Thumm asserted that the fingerprint report, though not discussed at 
trial as such, was actually exculpatory.  The fingerprint report indicated that Vance 
Thumm was the source of the latent print found on a broken Jose Cuervo Tequila bottle 
(Item 4A), but that Thumm was excluded as being the source of the latent prints 
recovered on a certain Budweiser bottle, broken pieces of a Jose Cuervo Tequila bottle, 
and an unopened bottle of  Olde English 800 Malt Liquor (Items 3A-1, 3A-5, 3A-7, 4A/5-
B, 4B-3, 6A-1 and 6A/L3-B).  (R., pp.181-183, 202-203).  No latent prints were 
discovered on several other tested pieces of evidence.  (R., p.202.)  Thumm asserts that 
this report was exculpatory because there was no evidence presented at trial that anyone 
was struck with the Tequila bottle – the only beverage container upon which Thumm’s 
prints were found; and because Hughes testified at trial that Thumm struck Ohls with an 
Olde English 800 Malt Liquor bottle and a Budweiser bottle – bottles seemingly similar 
to those upon which Thumm was excluded as being a source of recovered prints.  (R., 
pp.182-183; see also Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.879, L.8 – p.881, L.12.)    
 As the state argued in its brief in support of its motion for summary dismissal (R., 
pp.126-127),14 Thumm’s Brady claim was forfeited pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b).  While 
the state’s disclosure of the fingerprint evidence was untimely pursuant to the district 
                                                     
14 The district court did not dismiss this claim on the ground that it was forfeited pursuant 
to I.C. § 19-4901(b).  However, the state’s utilization of this ground in its brief in support 
of its motion for summary dismissal (R., pp.126-127), provided Thumm notice for this 
specific ground for dismissal, as required by I.C. § 19-4906.  Thumm’s specific response 
to this ground for dismissal in his response to the state’s motion for summary dismissal 
further indicates that he was actually aware of this ground for dismissal.  (R., p.226.)   
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court’s pretrial orders, disclosure still occurred prior to the jury trial.  Therefore, this 
claim could have been raised on direct appeal.    
 In his response to the state’s motion for summary dismissal, Thumm argued that 
the Brady claim could not have been raised on direct appeal because the fingerprint 
results were not in the appellate record.  (R., pp.225-226.)  However, “[i]t is the 
responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient record to substantiate his or her 
claims on appeal.”  Greenfield v. Smith, 162 Idaho 246, 253, 395 P.3d 1279, 1286 (2017) 
(citation omitted).  Thumm has failed to demonstrate or argue that he could not, in the 
exercise of due diligence, have included the fingerprint results in the appellate record.   
This claim is therefore forfeited pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b). 
 Thumm also argued that the state’s response to his Brady claim constituted an 
attempt to “whipsaw the Petitioner, asserting that the claim needed to be raised on direct 
appeal while also asserting that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it 
on direct appeal.”  (R., p.226 n.2.)  However, contrary to Thumm’s apparent assumption, 
it can be possible both that an individual waived a post-conviction claim by failing to 
include it in his direct appeal, and that the individual’s appellate counsel was not 
constitutionally deficient for exercising a strategic choice not to raise the claim.  Thumm 
does not possess a universal right for this claim to be considered on its merits in the 
manner of his choosing.  This claim may only be considered by Idaho’s courts if raised in 
compliance with applicable procedural rules regarding preservation and forfeiture.  
 In the alternative, Thumm’s Brady claim also fails on its merits.  In order to 
establish a Brady violation, there must be evidence that:  (1) is favorable to the accused 
because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was willfully or inadvertently 
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suppressed by the state; and (3) was prejudicial or material in that there is a reasonable 
probability that its disclosure to the accused would have led to a different result.  State v. 
Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 503, 399 P.32d 804, 830 (2017).  As the district court 
concluded (R., p.368), there is no evidence that the state suppressed the fingerprint report, 
either willfully or inadvertently.  The jury trial commenced on October 26, 2009.  (Trial 
Tr., Vol. I, p.5.)  The lab report, consistent with the prosecutor’s representation to the 
court, was not generated until October 19, 2009, at which point, the state disclosed it.  
(R., p.203.)  While the report was properly excluded by the district court due to its 
untimely generation and disclosure, there is no evidence that the report could have been 
disclosed any earlier.  Further, for all of the reasons discussed in greater detail below, 
Thumm failed to demonstrate any probability that the report, if disclosed earlier, could 
have been utilized by Thumm to secure a different trial result.   
 
D. Thumm’s Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Attempt To Utilize 
The Fingerprint Evidence At Trial 
 
 Thumm also asserts, in the alternative to his Brady claim, that the district court 
erred by summarily dismissing his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
recognize the exculpatory nature of the fingerprint evidence, and for failing to attempt to 
utilize the report at trial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.26-27.)  However, as the district court 
concluded (R., pp.387-389), Thumm has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief on 
this claim.   
 First, as the district court noted (R., p.388), the fingerprint report was of limited 
usefulness in this case because Thumm was not actually charged with striking Ohls with 
any beverage containers.  (See Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.50, L.16 – p.51, L.4.)  Further, the report 
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did not disprove the state’s theory of the case or necessarily demonstrate that anyone 
testified falsely about the attack.  Hughes testified that Thumm struck Ohls with: (1) an 
Olde English bottle that was not full and which was broken in the course of the attack; 
and (2) a Budweiser bottle that was also broken in the course of the attack.  (Trial Tr., Vol. 
II, p.879, L.8 – p.881, L.12.)  The Olde English bottle described by Hughes does not 
appear to be the same bottle as the unopened Olde English Bottle (Item 6A), that was 
found to contain prints from which Thumm was excluded as the contributor.  (R., pp.202-
203.)  Likewise, the Budweiser bottle described by Hughes does not clearly or necessarily 
correspond to the specific Budweiser bottles, or pieces thereof, identified in the report 
which contained prints from which Thumm was excluded as the contributor.  (Id.)  
Therefore, and in light of the strength of the state’s case, Thumm has failed to 
demonstrate that even had trial counsel attempted to utilize the fingerprint evidence, that 
trial court would have admitted the evidence at that stage in the proceeding, let alone that 
such evidence would have resulted in a different trial outcome.  
IV. 
Thumm Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims 
 
A. Introduction 
Thumm contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim 
that the prosecutor committed misconduct in numerous respects during closing argument.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.39-41.)  As the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.389-391), 





B. Standard Of Review 
 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on 
file.”  Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803. 
 
C. Thumm’s Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims Are Forfeited 
 
As discussed above, a post-conviction petition is not a substitute for a direct 
appeal, and any issue which could have been raised to the trial court or on direct appeal, 
but was not, is forfeited.  I.C. § 19-4901(b); see also Bias, 159 Idaho at 702-703, 365 P.3d 
at 1056-1057.  A post-conviction petition may overcome this forfeiture only if “it appears 
to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or 
otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability 
of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented 
earlier.”  Id. 
In this case, as the district court recognized (R., pp.390-391), each of Thumm’s 
prosecutorial misconduct claims could have been raised on direct appeal.  Thumm has not 
argued to the contrary.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.39-41.)  Therefore, these claims are 
forfeited, and Thumm has failed to show that the district court erred.     
 
D. Thumm’s Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Declining To Object To The 
Alleged Instances Of Prosecutorial Misconduct At Trial 
 
 Thumm argues, in the alternative, that if his prosecutorial misconduct claims 
could not be raised in his post-conviction petition, then his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to preserve these claims with a contemporaneous trial objection.  (Appellant’s 
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brief, p.40.)  However, as the district court concluded (R., pp.389-391), this alternative 
claim fails as a matter of law.    
 This claim is conclusory.  Thumm has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s 
decision not to object to the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct was anything 
but strategic.  Nor has Thumm demonstrated that any of the objections would have been 
successful, let alone that they would have changed the outcome of the proceeding.   
 Further, “[f]rom a strategic perspective…many trial lawyers refrain from 
objecting during closing argument to all but the most egregious misstatements by 
opposing counsel on the theory that the jury may construe their objections to be a sign of 
desperation or hyper-technicality.”  United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 
1991).  A defense attorney may also decide to not object because he believes the 
prosecutor’s argument is helpful to his case or believes he can capitalize on the 
prosecutor’s statements during his own closing argument.  Id.; see also Lambert v. 
McBride, 365 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Under Strickland, we must note that there 
may very well be strategic reasons for counsel not to object during closing arguments.  
Counsel may have been trying to avoid calling attention to the statements and thus giving 
them more force.”); United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) (counsel’s 
decision not to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument “falls within the range of 
permissible conduct of trial counsel”).  “Whatever the actual explanation, Strickland 
requires [the Court] to ‘indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’”  Molina, 934 F.2d at 1448 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  “This presumption especially applies to silence in 
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the face of allegedly improper arguments.”  Vicory v. State, 81 S.W.3d 725, 731 (Mo. 
App. 2002) (citation omitted).     
 In light of the strong presumption that a trial attorney’s decisions regarding 
whether to object during closing argument are strategic, and the absence of evidence to 
the contrary in this case, Thumm has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on 
this claim or that the district court erred by summarily dismissing it.  
 
V. 
Thumm Has Failed To Demonstrate Cumulative Error 
 
 Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in themselves, 
may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.  State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 
453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994).  A necessary predicate to application of the doctrine is a 
finding of more than one error.  State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 
1998).  Therefore, since a finding of Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel requires 
a showing of both deficient performance and prejudice, there is no prejudice to cumulate 
when a petitioner has failed to demonstrate more than one incident of deficient 
performance.  See Spotz, 18 A.3d at 321.  The ultimate question of Strickland prejudice, 
and thus, how Strickland prejudice may “cumulate,” is whether the defendant was denied 
“a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.     
 In his amended post-conviction petition and supporting briefing, Thumm asserted 
that the numerous instances of deficient performance of his trial counsel resulted in 
cumulative prejudice.  (R., pp.148-149, 226.)  As discussed above, Thumm framed his 
underlying post-conviction petition, and this appeal, as presenting a series of instances of 
deficient performance which, while relatively insignificant individually, cumulated to 
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constitute a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.  
(See Tr., p.31, L.25 – p.32, L.8; Appellant’s brief, p.1.)      
 On appeal, while Thumm cited the cumulative error standard (Appellant’s brief, 
p.12), and asserted, in a conclusory manner, that the instances of deficient performance 
had a “cumulative effect” (Appellant’s brief, p.1), he has not provided specific argument 
regarding the manner in which prejudice cumulated and why he is entitled to relief.  
Therefore, the state asserts that this claim is waived pursuant to Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 
923 P.2d at 970 (“A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument 
is lacking, not just if both are lacking.” (emphasis added)). 
 In any event, should this Court choose to the address the merits of Thumm’s claim 
of cumulative Strickland prejudice, the state submits that this claim fails as a matter of 
law, and the district court therefore properly dismissed it.  For the reasons discussed 
above, Thumm failed to demonstrate any instances of Strickland deficient performance, 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order 
summarily dismissing Thumm’s post-conviction petition.  




        /s/  Mark W. Olson 
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